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Shadows:
Hidden by Sovereign
Improving the Domestic Framework
State-Sponsored
Deterring
for
Cybercrime
Eric Blinderman* & Myra Din**
ABSTRACT

This Article analyzes the domestic legal framework
applicable to state-sponsored cybercrime. The Article describes
several instances where state sovereigns perpetratedcybercrimes
in the United States. It then outlines the legal framework that
the US government utilizes to hold accountable those who
perpetrate such crimes. This Article argues that the current
legal framework does not have a deterrence effect on sovereign
states engaged in such activity and that prosecutors who seek to
apply the current framework against state sovereigns or who
misattribute the source of such attacks could negatively impact
US foreign policy. To remedy these defects, this Article asserts
that relevant US law should apply extraterritoriallyand that
Congress should contemplate passing a statute that abrogates
sovereign immunity for state sponsors of cybercrime and
subjects such states to civil liability.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the first tribes evolved into sovereign states and began
competing with one another for resources, power, and influence, they
have sought to obtain advantage over the others through the
gathering and use of confidential and sensitive information and the
forcible destruction of a competitor and its resources.1 Traditional
diplomacy, spying, monitoring of foreign news outlets, military force,
and other similar tools have long been deployed to allow sovereigns to
gain and utilize such information and/or to obtain advantage over a
competitor. Since the advent of the information age, however, these
tools have evolved radically as sovereigns seek to exploit the

1.
Even the Bible chronicles that espionage has been consistent with the law
of nations since Moses sent spies into Israel. "Yet there is no doubt, but the law of
nations allows any one to send spies, as Moses did to the land of promise, of whom
Joshua was one." HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, INCLUDING THE LAw

OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS 331 (A.C. Campbell, trans., M. Walter Dunne 1901) (1625).
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vulnerabilities that attach to the mass storage and transmission of
information across a variety of digital platforms. 2
This technological complexity has also given rise to equally
complicated legal issues that attach when a sovereign deploys its
digital arsenal against another state in a manner which violates the
domestic laws of the target state. For example, attributing cyber
action to a sovereign is often a difficult task given the multitude of
state and non-state actors that perpetrate such actions.3 Additionally,
if a sovereign is implicated in such an action, the international and
domestic legal framework designed to hold the sovereign responsible
for such criminal activity is nearly nonexistent.4 Likewise, the
domestic legal norms across each state pertaining to these types of
cyber activities vary wildly. 5 This lack of uniformity makes it

See, e.g., Julian Borger, Brazilian President: US Surveillance a "breach of
2.
international law," THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/sep/24/brazil-president-un-speech-nsa-surveillance [https://perma.cc/5FGC88JP] (archived Aug. 26, 2017); David E. Sanger, Document Reveals Growth of
Cyberwarfare Between the U.S. and Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2015),
2015/02/23/us/document-reveals-growth-of-cyberwarfarehttps://www.nytimes.com/
between-the-us-and-iran.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/7T8C-UNHX] (archived Aug. 25,
2017); David E. Sanger, Iran Fights Malware Attacking Computers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
25,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/world/middleeast/26iran.html
[https://perma.ccl2J3P=2Q4C] (archived Aug. 26, 2017); lan Traynor, Russia accused of
unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia, THE GUARDIAN (May 17, 2007),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia

[https://perma.ccl9NVU-HM7X] (archived Aug. 26, 2017).
One of the leading international sources on international cybercrime is the
3.
Tallinn Manual. This comprehensive manual is the product of a study conducted by an
International Group of Experts that purports to apply existing international law to the
cyber warfare context. Several rules in this manual govern attribution, underscoring
the innate complexities when attributing cyberattacks to sovereign states. See
MANUAL ON THE
generally INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, TALLINN
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt et al. eds.,

2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
4.
Indeed, while the European Convention on Cybercrime is designed to
simplify some of the jurisdictional issues that arise when cross-border cyberattacks
occur, the convention was designed to address cybercrime perpetrated by private actors
as opposed to government actors. See Convention on Cybercrime, Jan. 7, 2004, C.E.T.S.
No. 185; Professor Kesan on the Sony Hack, North Korea and the Laws Governing
Cyber-Attack, ILL. L. FACULTY BLOG (Jan. 13, 2015), http://uiuclawfaculty.typepad.com/
[https://perma.cc/4P5Efacultyblog/2015/01/professor-kesan-on-the-sony-hack.html
DWH8] (archived Aug. 26, 2017).
5.
Consider the example of China. Just this past November, China
implemented new cybersecurity regulations to increase dramatically data localization
and state surveillance. These laws require all technology companies in China to require
users to register with their real names and personal information and to censor content
that is "prohibited." Kate Conger, China's new cybersecurity law is bad for business,
https://techerunch.com/2016/11/06/chinas-newTECHCRUNCH
(Nov.
6
2016),
cybersecurity-law-is-bad-news-for-business/ [https://perma.cclLYL7-RLRU]
(archived
Aug. 29, 2017). Such a regime stands in stark contrast to the European Union, which
has gradually expanded privacy rights. Indeed, in 2014, the European Court of Justice
held that the Data Retention Directive, a mandate that required each member state to
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extraordinarily difficult for any enforcement authority to make a
reasoned judgement about when permissible information-gathering
crosses into the realm of impermissible cybercrime. In addition, the
diplomatic consequences of misattribution make the stakes for
assessing cybercrime especially high. 6
Although analyzing the multitude of these challenges is beyond
the scope of this Article, it is important to understand the basic
framework within the United States that federal prosecutors rely
upon when trying to hold accountable actors who perpetrate such
crimes.7 Even more relevant is understanding how this framework
applies in the unique context when a sovereign state is implicated in
such criminal activity. By better understanding this framework and
applying it to instances where sovereigns have seized information
from persons, juridical or natural, located in the United States, one
can understand the limitations current law enforcement faces when
seeking to punish such activity. Most importantly, by understanding
these limitations, one can also propose changes to the current
domestic framework so that such criminal activity is effectively
deterred and perpetrators are held accountable for their actions.
This Article does the following. Part I describes recent instances
of sovereign use of digital tools to perpetrate various crimes. Part II
describes the legal framework that the US government utilizes when
it concludes that a sovereign was implicated in a crime. It also
discusses the international legal framework that could be (but is
generally not) employed by the United States to address such
criminal activity. Part III argues that there are two main
shortcomings with the present domestic legal framework applicable to
such sovereign criminal activity, including but not limited to whether:
(1) domestic prosecutions actually have a deterrence effect on
sovereign states perpetrating such crimes, and (2) prosecutors who
overreach in their application of US law against foreign actors or
misattribute the source of cyberattacks on the basis of insufficient
evidence negatively impact US foreign policy. This Article then
concludes by arguing that if the public wishes for the government to
prosecute effectively state-sponsored actors, then the domestic legal
framework should allow for the robust extraterritorial application of
retain citizens' personal data, violated the fundamental right to privacy enshrined
under European Union Law. Joined Cases C-293/12 & 0594/12, Digital Rights Ir. Ltd.
v. Minister for Commc'n, 2014 E.C.R. 1-238.
6.
See Howard Lipson, Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical
Challenges and Global Policy Issues, CERT COORDINATION CENTER (Nov. 2002),
http://resources.sei.cmu.edulasset_files/SpecialReport/2002 003 00113928.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PM92-XVKQI (archived Aug. 26, 2017).
7.
One thing that is clear. The US Intelligence Community's desired method
for prosecuting sovereign state actors is through domestic legal frameworks. See John
P. Carlin, The FBI Wants to Try North Korean Sony Hackers in US Courts,
MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 23, 2015), https://motherboard.vice.com/enus/article/the-fbiwants-to-try-north-korean-sony-hackers-in-us-courts
[https://perma.ccVBH8-AUTS]
(archived Aug. 26, 2017).
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US laws. Further, this Article concludes by arguing that Congress
should contemplate passing a statute that exposes sovereign state
perpetrators to civil liability.

II.

DESCRIPTION OF SOVEREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN CYBERCRIME

On a nearly daily basis, news outlets report alleged instances in
which a sovereign state has engaged in digital espionage or sabotage
against another. 8 Each instance of such activity raises fundamental
definitional problems as to what constitutes cybercrime and when law
enforcement officials should attribute digital criminal activity to a
sovereign state as opposed to a non-state actor. To answer these
definitional problems, the next Parts of the Article analyze four
specific instances of alleged cybercriminal activity directed against
the United States and in violation of US domestic law: (a) the People's
Liberation Army of China's (PLA) alleged theft of digitally stored
trade secrets and information from various US companies, which was
then used to benefit Chinese companies; (b) the Russian government's

8.
See, e.g., Andrzej Kozlowski, Comparative Analysis of Cyberattack on
Estonia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan,
3
EUR. SCI. J. 237, 238
(2014),
http://www.eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/viewFile/2941/2770
[https://perma.cclT3QV-4N76] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) (comparing three allegedly
Russian state-sponsored cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and
Kyrgyzstan in 2009 respectively); Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Sony Cyberattack,
First a Nuisance, Swiftly Grew Into a Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/3lfbusiness/media/sony-attack-first-a-nuisanceswiftly-grew-into-a-firestorm-.html [https://perma.cc/BQ7N-Y82W] (archived Aug. 27,
2017) (describing a 2014 cyberattack believed to be launched by North Korea against
Sony Pictures Entertainment, located in the United States); Hackers Leak Emails from
UAE
Ambassador
to
US,
AL
JAZEERA
(June
4,
2017),
http://www.aljazeera.comnews/2017/06/hackers-leak-emails-uae-ambassador170603153956229.html [https://perma.cc/95L2-Q5H6] (archived Aug. 26, 2017)
(describing how recently the United Arab Emirates' Ambassador to the United States,
Yousef al-Otaiba, was hacked); Steve Lohr & Liz Alderman, The FalloutFrom a Global
Cyberattack: 'A Battle We're Fighting Every Day, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/world/asia/china-cyberattack-hackransomware.html_[https://perma.cc/334M-TDJ5] (archived Aug. 26, 2017) (describing a
recent global hack which was first detected in Britain but also infiltrated many
computer systems of prestigious institutions and healthcare services systems
throughout China, India, and Russia); Gerry Mullany & Paul Mozur, Cyberattack
Spreads in Asia; Thousands of Groups Affected, BERKSHIRE EAGLE (May 16, 2017),
http://www.berkshireeagle.com/stories/cyberattack-spreads-in-asia,507471; Choe SangHun, Paul Mozur, Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Focus Turns to North Korea
Sleeper Cells as Possible Culprits in Cyberattack, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/worldlasia/north-korea-cyber-sleeper-cellsransomware.html [https://perma.cc/3Q8Y-ST7Y] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) (describing
how cybersecurity experts believe North Korea has spread "cadres of digital soldiers"
across the border to China and other countries who are trained to engage in electronic
warfare against South Korea and the United States).
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hacking into and seizing of over 500 million Yahoo user accounts in
2014; (c) the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' coordinated
attack on forty-six major US companies mostly in the financial sector
in order to harm American infrastructure and American people; and
(d) the Russian government's alleged theft of politically sensitive
information from the Democratic National Committee and
subsequent leaking of that information to cause damage to the US
democratic system.
After reviewing the facts pertaining to these four instances of
purported sovereign state cybercrime,
this Article defines
"cybercrime" as any digital activity which runs afoul of US domestic
criminal statutes.9 Secondly, it argues that sovereign attribution to
cybercrime should attach when any individual, arm, or agency of a
sovereign acts, or acting at the direction of a sovereign, is directly
responsible, aids or abets those responsible, conspires with those
responsible, or otherwise facilitates the perpetration of such
cybercriminal activity.1 0

9.
This definition is based upon analogous reasoning included in the latest
edition of the Tallinn Manual. In the Manual's Section on Sovereignty, Jurisdiction,
and Control, Rule 5 explains that unlawful cyber activity denotes an activity "that is
contrary to the legal rights of the affected State." See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 3
(providing the definition of "unlawful" as it is used in Rule 5 - Control of Cyber
Infrastructure, designed not limiting the prohibition to narrower concepts). The
International Group of Experts that drafted the Manual further explain that they
"deliberately chose not to limit the prohibition to narrower concepts, such as use of
force (Rule 11) or armed attack (Rule 13), in order to emphasize that the prohibition
extends to all cyber activities from one State's territory that affect the rights of other
States and have detrimental effects on another State's territory." Id.
10.
This standard too derives from the latest determinations made by the
International Group of Experts in the Tallinn Manual. In Rule 5, the Manual instructs
that for purposes of attribution, "A state shall not knowingly allow the cyber
infrastructure located in its territory or under its exclusive governmental control to be
used for acts that adversely and unlawfully affect other States." The manual further
explains there is not yet consensus as to whether state attribution is appropriate where
a state has constructive knowledge of cyber activities occurring from its territory or
governmental structures. As such, the Tallinn Manual imposes a high standard for
state attribution, one close to effective or direct control, with a high bar for specific
intent, rather than applying the more lenient overall control standard that has
occasionally been employed in international law. Id.; see also G.A. Res. 56/83,
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/83 (Dec. 12,
2001). For a discussion about the competing standards for state attribution under
modern international law, see Scott J. Shackleford, State Responsibility for Cyber
Attacks: Competing Standardsfor a Growing Problem, CONF. ON CYBER CONFLICT 197198
(2010),
https://cedcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedialpdf/Shackelford%20%20State%2OResponsibility%2ofor%20Cyber%2OAttacks%20Competing%20Standards
%20for%20a%2OGrowing%2OProblem.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HB4E-Y88C]
(archived
Aug. 26, 2017).
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China: The People's LiberationArmy's Hack of US Companies

On May 1, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice formally
charged five Chinese officers of the PLA with various crimes related
to computer hacking and economic espionage." Specifically,
defendants Wang Dong, Sun Kailiang, Wen Xinyu, Huang Zhenyu,
and Gu Chunhui were indicted by a grand jury in the Western
District of Pennsylvania for violating and conspiring to violate the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),1 2 aggravated identity
theft,1 3 economic espionage,1 4 and trade secret theft. 15 The
indictment states:
From at least in or about 2006 up to and including at least in or about April
2014, members of the People's Liberation Army ("PLA"), the military of the
People's Republic of China ("China"), conspired together with each other to
hack into the computers of commercial entities located in the Western District
of Pennsylvania and elsewhere in the United States, to maintain unauthorized
access to those computers, and to steal information from those entities that
would be useful to their competitors in China, including state-owned
16
enterprises ("SOEs").

The six companies named as victims of the computer hacking
were: Westinghouse, an electronic and nuclear power company;
SolarWorld, a German solar products manufacturer; United States
Steel Corporation, the largest steel company in the United States;
Alleghany Technologies Incorporated, a large specialty metals
company; United Steel Workers International Union, the largest
industrial labor union in North America; and Alcoa, the largest
aluminum company in the United States.' 7 Taken together, the six
victims represent major segments of American nuclear power, metals
production, and solar power.
The indictment describes how the PLA systematically stole trade
secrets at moments that were particularly opportune for Chinese
companies.' 8 For example, the indictment describes how during 2011

Press Release, The U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese
11.
Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor
Organization
for
Commercial
Advantage
(May
19,
2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyberespionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor_[https://perma.ccTY7G-C4ME] (archived
Aug. 26, 2017).
12.
Indictment at 35-38, U.S. v. Wang Dong et. al., No. 14-118 (W.D. Pa. May
1, 2014); see Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2016).
13.
Indictment at 43, Wang Dong, No. 14-118; see 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2016).
14.
Indictment at 45, Wang Dong, No. 14-118; see 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2016).
15.
Indictment at 47, Wang Dong, No. 14-118; see 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2016).
16.
Indictment at 1, Wang Dong, No. 14-118.
17.
Id. at 4-7.
18.
Id. at 2.
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and 2012, around the time when Oregon-based solar products
manufacturer SolarWorld was losing market share to Chinese
competitors and was active in trade litigation, Chinese solar
manufacturers were continually dumping large volumes of solar
products into US markets at below-fair-value market prices.19 Then
in May 2012, Defendant Wen "hacked into SolarWorld's computers
and stole e-mails and files belonging to three senior executives." 20
Following that hack, Wen and at least one other member of the
conspiracy conducted at least twelve more intrusions into and
exfiltrations from SolarWorld's computers, enabling them to steal
thousands of e-mail messages and other files containing detailed
financial information, production capabilities, business strategies,
litigation strategies, and confidential cost-structure information from
SolarWorld employees.2 1
The indictment similarly alleges that right around when nuclear
power developer Westinghouse was in negotiations with a Chinese
company over the construction and operation of four power plants in
China, PLA conspirators stole proprietary and confidential technical
and design specifications for pipes, pipe supports, and pipe routing for
nuclear power plants.2 2 Given that Westinghouse's designs are the
basis for approximately half of the world's currently operating
nuclear power plants and given that many of these plants have
unique safety features that have taken Westinghouse over fifteen
years to develop,2 3 the theft provided Chinese competitors with
critical information to build similar plants without having to
undertake significant research and development costs.
While the indictment further details the timing and methodology
behind several cyberattacks committed on the other four American
corporate victims, numerous research organizations, such as the
prominent cybersecurity firm, Mandiant, have published reports
delineating how the PLA's systematic espionage of these victims
represents only a fraction of the numerous US companies that statesponsored actors have targeted in recent years. 24
Members of the intelligence community continually warn that
China presents "one of the most significant economic and national

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 13-15.
Id.
24.
See MANDIANT APT 1: ExPOSING ONE OF CHINA'S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS
(2013). "The indictment announced today is an important step. But there are many
more victims, and there is much more to be done. With our unique criminal and
national security authorities, we will continue to use all legal tools at our disposal to
counter cyber espionage from all sources." U.S. Dep't of Justice, supranote 11.
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security challenges facing the U.S." 25 Thus, shortly after the PLA

indictment was filed, then FBI Director James Comey commented
that "[flor too long, the Chinese Government has blatantly sought to
use cyber espionage to obtain economic advantage for its state-owned
industries."2 6 He added:
Success in the global market place should be based solely on a company's
ability to innovate and compete, not on a sponsor government's ability to spy
and steal business secrets. This administration will not tolerate actions by any
nation that seeks to illegally sabotage American companies and undermine the
27
integrity of fair competition in the operation of the free market.

Although the indictment has limited reach, insofar as the
defendants will unlikely ever be extradited to the United States, its
issuance represents a watershed moment in US history. According to
former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, the case "represents the
first ever charges against a state actor for this type of hacking," and
"[t]he range of trade secrets and other sensitive business information
stolen in this case .

.

. demand an aggressive response." 28 John Carlin,

the former Assistant Attorney General for National Security, agrees,
emphasizing: "State actors engaged in cyber espionage for economic
advantage are not immune from the law just because they hack under
the shadow of their country's flag." 29
Despite the fact that none of the defendants has yet stood trial in
the United States, the mere existence of this attack and subsequent
indictment illustrates how sovereigns can utilize cyber warfare
techniques to gain financial or legal advantage for the benefit of
domestic constituents. Likewise, it raises the prospect (at least with
respect to the seizure of nuclear information) that sovereigns could
seize sensitive designs and information to benefit their military.3 0 In

25.
Hearing on Commercial Cyber Espionage and Barriersto Digital Trade in
China Before the U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission, 114th Cong.
1 (2015) (statement of Paul M. Tiao, Partner, Hunton & Williams LLP).
26.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 11.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
In fact, the PLA was alleged to have done exactly this. According to an
30.
indictment issued against a Chinese National named Su Bin who was resident in
Canada, members of the PLA sent spear phishing emails to various military
contractors located in the United States including Boeing and Lockheed Martin. The
military then copied relevant directories and transmitted them to Mr. Bin who (in
turn) advised the PLA about which directories to copy. The PLA transmitted all copied
information to Mr. Bin who translated them into Chinese and prepared reports on their
contents, which included technical and highly sensitive information about the F-22
fighter jet, the C-17, and the F-35 fighter jet. Mr. Bin was extradited from Canada to
the United States and pled guilty to violating the CFAA.
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this case, however, all that transpired was the seizure of industrial
information.
B.

Russia: The Federal Security Service's Hack of Yahoo

On March 15, 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice formally
charged two Russian intelligence agents and two hackers with
orchestrating the theft of 500 million Yahoo accounts starting in
January 2014.31 The indictment, issued by a grand jury in the
Northern District of California, alleges that at least two officers of the
Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) engaged in computer
hacking, economic espionage, and other criminal offenses in
connection with a conspiracy to access Yahoo's network and the
contents of webmail accounts. 3 2 Significantly, this represents the first
instance where the United States criminally charged Russian spies
for cybercriminal conduct.3 3
The indictment provides that "[fjrom at least in or about 2014 up
to and including at least in or about December 2016, officers of the
[FSB] .

.

. conspired together and with each other to protect, direct,

facilitate, and pay criminal hackers to collect information through
computer intrusions in the United States and elsewhere." 34 It further
explains that the conspirators gained "unauthorized access to the
computers of companies providing webmail and internet-related
services located in the Northern District of California and elsewhere,
to maintain unauthorized access to those computers, and to steal
information from those computers, including information regarding,
and communications of, the providers' users."35
The indictment states that some of the information the
conspirators sought was of "predictable interest" to the FSB, such as
Yahoo email accounts of Russian journalists, Russian and US
government officials, employees of a prominent Russian cybersecurity
company, and numerous employees of US, Russian, and other foreign

31.
Dustin Volz, U.S. authoritiescharge Russian spies, hackers in huge Yahoo
hack, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-hackindictments-fsb-idUSKBN16NOCO [https://perma.cc/R596-VDKA] (archived Aug. 27,
2017).
32.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 11 (reporting the identity of the
defendants: "Dmitry Aleksandrovich Dokuchaev, 33, a Russian national and resident;
Igor Anatolyevich Sushchin, 43, a Russian national and resident; Alexsey Alexseyevich
Belan, aka "Magg," 29, a Russian national and resident; and Karim Baratov, aka
"Kay," "Karim Taloverov" and "Karim Akehmet Tokbergenov," 22, a Canadian national
and a resident of Canada).
33.
Volz, supra note 31.
34.
The FSB is "an intelligence and law enforcement agency of the Russian
Federation ("Russia") headquartered in Lubyanka Square, Moscow, Russia, and a
successor service to the Soviet Union's Committee of State Security ("KGB") . . . ."
Indictment at 2, U.S. v. Dmitry Dokuchaev et. al., No. 17-103 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2017).
35.
Id.
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webmail and Internet-related service providers whose networks the
conspirators sought to further exploit. 36 In addition, the conspirators
allegedly sought access to accounts of employees of commercial
entities, including a prominent Russian investment banking firm, a
French transportation company, a US financial services firm, a Swiss
banking firm, and a US airline.3 7
Importantly, Interpol had issued a "Red Notice" and the United
States had listed one of the hackers, Alexsey Alexseyevich Belan, on
its "Most Wanted" list in 2012, prior to the Yahoo incident.3 8 Instead
of cooperating with US authorities by either extraditing Belan or
prosecuting him in Russia, Russian intelligence instead decided to
use him for assistance with FSB investigations and to rely upon his
skills as a hacker to gather sensitive intelligence information without
detection.3 9 Indeed, Belan is alleged to have led the successful
infiltration of Yahoo's network and also used his access to Yahoo's
network to personally enrich himself through a scam marketing
scheme. 40 As to the other three defendants, the indictment alleges
that the two FSB agents named as defendants, Igor Anatolyevich
Sushchin and Dmitry Dokuchaev, paid bounties to the other hacker
defendants, such as Karim Baratov, when they successfully hacked
into the email accounts of individuals who were FSB "targets of
interest.""4

The indictment charges all four defendants with conspiring to
commit computer fraud and abuse under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b). 42 In addition, it charges three
of the defendants (Dokuchaev, Sushchin, and Belan) with conspiring
to engage in economic espionage and theft of trade secrets under 18
U.S.C. § 1831(a)(5) and 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(5), respectively. 4 3
Further, all four defendants were charged with theft of trade secrets,
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and various other counts under the
CFAA. 44 Finally, Defendants Dokuchaev and Baratov were also
charged with aggravated identity theft.4 5
In response to issuance of the indictment, Attorney General Jeff
Sessions stated:
Cyber crime poses a significant threat to our nation's security and prosperity,
and this is one of the largest data breaches in history. . . . But thanks to the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

2-3.
3.
5-16.
17-19.
20-24.
29-30.
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tireless efforts of U.S. prosecutors and investigators, . . . [t]he United States
will vigorously investigate and prosecute the people behind such attacks to the
fullest extent of the law.4 6

As the next two subparts explain, sovereigns often perpetrate
cybercrimes for even more nefarious purposes, such as to harm a
target's economy or to sabotage its infrastructure.
C.

Iran: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps'Hack of the US
FinancialSector and Infrastructure

On March 24, 2016, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of New York announced the indictment of seven Iranians for
conducting a coordinated campaign of cyberattacks against the US
financial sector on behalf of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) and other Iranian state entities. 47 The seven named

defendants, Ahmad Fathi, Hamid Firoozi, Amin Shokohi, Sadegh
Ahmadzadegan, Omid Ghaffarinia, Sina Keissar, and Nader Saedi,
were alleged experienced computer hackers employed by two private
computer security companies based in Iran but who performed work
on behalf of the Iranian government, including specifically the
IRGC. 48
As alleged in the indictment, the defendants "conducted
extensive computer network exploitation and computer network
attacks against victim corporations in the United States [including]
approximately 46 major financial institutions and other financialsector corporations . . . over a total of at least approximately 176
days." 49 Specifically, the defendants were alleged to have begun
perpetrating distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks 5 0 against
the US financial industry, commencing in December 2011, which
"variously disabled and attempted to disable computer servers
belonging to these corporations in an effort to prevent the
corporations from conducting business with customers online during
the course of the attacks, including, among other things, providing

46.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 11.
47.
See United States v. Fathi, No. 16-48 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 21, 2016).
48.
Id. at 1-2.
49.
Id. at 3. Targeted companies included Bank of America, N.A., NASDAQ,
the New York Stock Exchange, Capital One Bank, N.A., PNC Bank, AT&T, Inc., Ally
Bank, American Express, Ameriprise, Bank of Montreal, BB&T, Banco Nilbao Vizyana
Argentaria, J.P. Morgan, Chase Bank, Citibank, N.A. Citizens Bank, Fifth Third Bank,
FirstBank, HSBC, Key Bank, Regions Bank, State Street Bank, SunTrust Bank, Union
Bank, N.A., US Bank, Wells Fargo, and Zions First National Bank. Id. at 5, 10.
50.
A DDoS occurs when a malicious actor takes control of many computers
and servers (often numbering hundreds of thousands, with each individual computer
referred to as a "bot" and the collective referred to as a "botnet") and directs those
computers and servers to flood a victim server with electronic communications in order
to disable the server and prevent it from receiving and maintaining connections with
legitimate internet traffic. Id. at 2.
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online banking services and other information to customers."5 1 These
attacks resulted on certain days in hundreds of thousands of
customers failing to access their online bank accounts and caused
tens of millions of dollars in remediation costs for the affected
companies. 52
To perpetrate this attack, the defendants were alleged to have
created malicious computer scripts on thousands of computers and
computer servers, some of which were located in the United States,
which allowed them to obtain remote access and control of the
compromised computers.5 3 Further, the defendants were alleged to
have leased computer servers in the United States, allowing them to
coordinate and direct their DDoS attacks. 54 To attribute the attack to
the Iranian government, the indictment noted that at least one
defendant received credit for his computer intrusion work towards
completion of his mandatory military service in Iran.5 5 All seven
defendants were charged with computer hacking in violation of the
CFAA, 56 while four defendants5 7 were also charged with conspiracy to
violate the CFAA. 5 8
One defendant, Hamid Firoozi, was additionally charged with a
single count of unauthorized access to a protected computer in
violation of the CFAA. 59 According to the indictment, Mr. Firoozi,
obtained repeated and unauthorized access from August 28, 2013 to
September 18, 2013 to a computer that controlled a dam located in
Rye, New York. 60 Upon hacking into the dam's computer, Mr. Firoozi
was able to obtain information about water levels and temperature

51.
Id. at 3-4.
52.
See id.
Id. at 7-8.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 6.
55.
56.
Id. at 8--9. All the Defendants were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §§
1030(a)(5)(A), (c)(4)(B)(i), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I), (c)(4)(A)(i)(VI).
Defendants Sadegh Ahmadzadegan, Omid Ghaffarinia, Sina Keissar, and
57.
Nader Saedi (referred to in the indictment as the "Mersad Defendants" since the
computer security company that employed them was named Mersad Co.) were charged
with a single count of conspiracy. Id. at 10-12.
58.
Id. at 15-16. The Mersad Defendants were also charged with conspiracy to
violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A), (c)(4)(B)(i), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I), (c)(4)(A)(i)(VI) and 2. Id.
59.
Id. at 15. Mr. Firoozi was charged specifically with violating 18 U.S.C. §§
1030(a)(5)(B), (c)(4)(A)(i)(i), (c)(4)(A)(i)(IV) and 2. Id.
60.
Id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Seven Iranians Working for
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Affiliated Entities Charged for Conducting
Coordinated Campaign of Cyber Attacks Against U.S. Financial Sector (Mar. 24, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guardcorps-affiliated-entities-charged [https://perma.cc/9NTP-QSUZ] (archived Aug. 29,
2017); see also David E. Sanger, U.S. Indicts 7 Tied to Iranian Unit in Cyberattacks,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/world/middleeast/usindicts-iranians-in-cyberattacks-on-banks-and-a-dam. html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/4GXU-SVNR] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
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and the status of the dam's sluice gate, which controls water levels
and flow rates. 61 Indeed, Mr. Firoozi's access would have allowed him
to "remotely operate and manipulate the sluice gate on the Bowman
Dam," but fortunately the gate was manually disconnected for
maintenance at the time he gained access to the systems. 6 2
As this example of sovereign state cybercrime illustrates, the
motives for such an attack may extend to the crippling of a target's
economy and its basic infrastructure. The next illustration of
cybercrime goes even further and points out how such activities can
be utilized to effect regime change in a target.
D.

Russia: Cyber Interference with the 2016 US Election

On June 14, 2016, the Washington Post reported that: "Russian
government hackers penetrated the computer network of the
Democratic National Committee [(DNC)] and gained access to the
entire database of opposition research on GOP Presidential candidate
Donald Trump . . . [and] so thoroughly compromised the DNC's
system that they also were able to read all email and chat traffic." 63

On July 26, 2016, the New York Times also reported that American
intelligence had concluded with 'high confidence' that the Russian
Government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the
Democratic National Committee" and was motivated by either
"routine espionage," or "an effort to manipulate" the election. 64
In January 2017, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence
released a comprehensive report entitled Assessing Russian Activities
and Intentions in Recent US Elections.65 The report observed that
Russian cyber activities went far beyond the mere theft of email and
information from the DNC. 66 It described how Russian President
Vladimir Putin and the Russian government employed a unique
strategy that blended covert intelligence operations with overt efforts
by state-funded media, third party intermediaries, and paid social

61.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 60.
62.
Id.
63.
Ellen Nakashima, Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole
opposition
research
on
Trump,
WASH.
POST.
(June
14,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-government-hackerspenetrated-dnc-stole-opposition-research-on-trump2016/06/14/cfO06cb4-316e-1 1e68ff7-7b6cl998b7aostory.html?utm-term=.415605a77d24
[https://perma.cc/MT5FVMHB] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
64.
David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia
Hacked D.N.C., N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/us/
politics/spy-agency-consensus-grows-that-russia-hacked-dnc.html
[https://perma.cc/NMC8-626F] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
65.
OFFICE OF THE DiR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL,
ICA 2017-01D, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US
ELECTIONS (2017).

66.

Id. at ii.
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media users (trolls) to gain access to and information from specific
targets of both major political parties, which was then relayed to
select media sources. 67
Most significantly, the report concluded that "Russian President
Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign," with the goals of
"undermin[ing] public faith in the US democratic process,"
"denigrat[ing] Secretary Clinton, and harm[ing] her electability and
potential presidency."68 Admiral Michael Rogers, Director of the
National Security Agency (NSA) and Commander of U.S. Cyber
Command, stated that these activities constituted a "conscious effort
by a nation-state to attempt to achieve a specific effect," namely to
elect Donald Trump as President of the United States.6 9
The genesis of this attack began in the summer of 2015 when a
Russian hacking group named Cozy Bear sent spear phishing
emails7 0 to multiple government agencies, non-profits, and various
government contractors.71 Upon the exfiltration of documents from
the DNC, the Russian government expanded the scope of their
information-gathering activities to also include the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee. By September 2015, the FBI
reported to the DNC that at least one DNC computer had been
hacked by an entity referred to as "the Dukes,"72 which the FBI
explained was a "cyberespionage team linked to the Russian
government."73
The DNC largely ignored the FBI's warning, unsure of its
legitimacy.7 4 In November 2015, the FBI telephoned the DNC again
to report that at least one DNC computer was now "calling home" or
sending information to Moscow.

75

Distracted with allegations that

Id.
67.
68.
Id. (emphasis added).
69.
Eric Lipton, David E. Sanger & Scott Shane, The Perfect Weapon: How
Russian Cyberpower Invaded the United States, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-election-dnc.html
[https://perma.cc/A86E-KPAH] (archived Aug. 29, 2017). According to the article, prior
to the release of the report, Commander of the United States Cyber Command, Admiral
Michael S. Rogers, stated "This was not something that was done casually, this was not
something that was done by chance, this was not a target that was selected purely
arbitrarily." Id.
70.
A spear phishing email is an email that appears to be from a known
individual or business but is in fact from a criminal hacker seeking access to credit
card information, bank account numbers, passwords, and financial or other information
on
a
computer.
See
Spear Phishing: Scam,
Not
Sport,
NORTON,
https://us.norton.com/spear-phishing-scam-not-sport/article

[https://perma.cc/2Q9H-

JMRA] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
Lipton et al., supra note 69.
71.
72.
Id. The "Dukes" was also known as Cozy Bear and A.P.T.29, which stands
for advanced persistent threat. Id.
Id.
73.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
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Senator Bernie Sanders had improperly gained access to confidential
campaign data, the DNC failed to respond to this warning. 7 6 In
March 2016, the FBI finally met with representatives of the DNC to
convince them that the threat from Russia was real.7 7 By then,
however, a second set of Russian operatives had begun to attack DNC
computers.7 8 Operating under the pseudonym Fancy Bear or APT 28,
this second group of hackers allegedly took direct orders from
Russia's military intelligence agency, the GRU. 79
Fancy Bear first successfully breached the emails of Billy
Rinehart, a regional field director then working for Secretary Clinton.
Fancy Bear sent Rinehart a spear phishing email, purportedly from
Google, falsely stating that someone attempted to use Mr. Rinehart's
password to sign into his email and urging Mr. Rinehart to change
his password immediately through an embedded link.80 When he
followed these instructions, the Russian government received access
to his emails.8 1 Likewise, Secretary Clinton's campaign manager,
John Podesta, received a similar email notification. Although his
aides attempted to verify its legitimacy, the DNC technician drafted a
hasty response, intending to notify Mr. Podesta and his aides that the
email was "illegitimate", but instead misstated that the email was
"legitimate." 82 Consequently, when Mr. Podesta's aides clicked on the
link to change his password, the Russian government received access
to approximately sixty thousand of his emails.8 3
The Russian government's initial strategy purportedly was to
gather information. It later evolved into a broader effort to assist
Donald Trump win the election by weaponizing its information. 84 To
do this, a Russian government operative, utilizing the nom de guerre
Gucifer 2.0, bragged on Twitter that he had successfully hacked the
DNC computers and provided all his materials to WikiLeaks.8 5
Around the same time, the Russian government, through third
parties, created at least one website, www.DCleaks.com, to
86
disseminate data that it had collected.
In July, Gucifer 2.0 began engaging directly with media outlets
and transmitting documents designed to contradict Democratic
messaging.8 7
Twelve
days before
the Republican
National
Convention, Gucifer 2.0 released the Democratic Party's campaign

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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battle plan.88 Three weeks before the Democratic National
Convention, WikiLeaks published 44,053 DNC emails,8 9 causing
allegations that the DNC was favoring Hillary Clinton over Senator
Bernie Sanders."o Then, about one month before the election,
WikiLeaks published thousands of emails from John Podesta's
account.9 1 WikiLeaks continued publishing material from John
Podesta's account each day in the lead up to the election, which media
outlets continuously covered. 9 2
Whether these actions directly caused Secretary Clinton to lose
the campaign can never be known. Yet the Russian gover.nment's
clear breach of email servers and theft of information violated a host
of US domestic legal statutes for which no indictments have been
issued. Instead, in December 2016, then President Obama retaliated
against Russia by issuing Executive Order 13757 entitled Taking
Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency with Respect to
Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,9 3 which sanctioned
four Russian individualS 94 and five Russian entities for the

88.
Id.
89.
Search the DNC Email, WIKILEAKS, https://wikileaks.org/dnc-emails/ (last
visited Aug. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cclV57W-2TQB] (archived Aug. 25, 2017).
90.
Lipton et al., supra note 69 (claiming Donald J. Trump incessantly
highlighted the publication of these documents. At a minimum, Donald Trump's
campaign was aware that such leaks were imminent as a Republican operative named
Roger Stone tweeted on October 2, 2016 (five days before the Podesta emails were first
leaked) that "Wednesday @HillaryClinton is done. #Wikileaks.").
91.
Aaron Sharockman, It's True: Wikileaks dumped Podesta emails hour after
Trump Video Surfaced, POLITIFACT (Dec. 18, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/statements/2016/dec/18/john-podesta/its-true-wikileaks-dumped-podesta-emailshour-afte/ [https://perma.cc/7QPF-3WDS] (archived Aug. 25, 2017); The Podesta
Emails, WIKILEAKS, (last visited Aug. 25, 2017) https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/
[https://perma.cc/6HU2-2X5A] (archived Aug. 25, 2017).
92.
See, e.g., Amy Chozick & Nicholas Confessore, Hillary Clinton's Campaign
Strained to Hone Her Message, Hacked Emails Show, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/1 1/us/politics/hillary-clinton-emails.html?action=
click&contentCollection=Politics&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgt
ype=article [https://perma.cc/LQW7-LYLV] (archived Aug. 25, 2017); Peter Nicholas,
Colleen Nelson & James Grimaldi, Hacked Emails Show Hillary Clinton Team Trying
to Navigate Bill Clinton, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
hacked-emails-show-hillary-clinton-team-trying-to-navigate-bill-clinton- 1476485243
[https://perma.cclT7BX-CWLA] (archived Aug. 25, 2017); Abby Phillip & John Wagner,
Hacked WikiLeaks emails show concerns about Clinton candidacy, email server, WASH.
POST (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/hacked-wikileaksemails-show-concerns-about-clinton-candidacy-email-server/2016/10/12/cdacbbdO-908f11e6-a6a3-d5006laa9fae-story.html?utm-term=.5613486178c6
[https://perma.cc/WL9H-XMYC] (archived Aug. 25, 2017).
93.
Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect
to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities, Exec. Order No. 13757, 82 Fed. Reg.
1 (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-01-03/pdfl2016-31922.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HH9K-KHM2] (archived Aug. 25, 2017).
94.
These were Lieutenant General Igor Valentinovich Korobov (chief of the
GRU), Sergey Aleksandrovich Gizunov (deputy chief of the GRU), Igor Olegovich
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interference in the US election.9 5 In addition, then President Obama
ordered thirty-five Russian diplomats to leave the country and Russia
to close two diplomatic compounds.9 6

III. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE
TO STATE-SPONSORED CYBERCRIME

This Article next provides an explanation of the various domestic
statutes and foreign principles of law that could apply to the conduct
outlined in Part I.
A.

Domestic Framework: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

Congress enacted the precursor to the CFAA in 1984, when
computers were new in the workplace, recognizing that computer
hacking posed novel threats to national security.9 7 At the time, the
media's depiction of computer hacking led to Congress conceiving a
computer hacker as "'a bright, intellectually curious, and rebellious
youth,' who could 'become the white-collar crime superstar of
tomorrow."'9 8

The original act, known as the Counterfeit Access

Kostyukov (a first deputy chief of the GRU), and Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev
(another first deputy chief of the GRU). FACT SHEET: Actions in Response to Russian
Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS

SECRETARY
(Dec.
29,
2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/12/29/fact-sheet-actions-response-russian- malicious-cyber-activity-and
[https://perma.cc/PA7N-5ULF] (archived Aug. 25, 2017).
95.
These were the GRU, Russia's Federal Security Service (Russia's main
security agency, commonly referred to as the FSB, and the successor to the Soviet
Union's KGB), STLC, Ltd. Special Technology Center of St. Petersburg (an entity
which assisted the GRU in conducting signals intelligence operations), Zoresecurity,
aka Esage Lab (an entity which provided the GRU with technical research), and the
Autonomous Noncommercial Organization "Professional Association of Designers of
Data Processing Systems" (an organization which provided specialized training to the
GRU). Id.
96.
Evan Perez & Daniella Diaz, White House announces retaliation against
Russia: Sanctions, ejecting diplomats, CNN (Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2016/
12/29/politics/russia-sanctions-announced-by-white-house/
[https://perma.cc/E9T3B4GC] (archived Aug. 25, 2017).
97.
Myra F. Din, Breaching and Entering: When Data Scraping should be a
Federal Computer Hacking Crime, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 405, 415 (2016); Glenn R.
Schieck, Undercutting Employee Mobility: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the
Trade Secret Context, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 831, 831-32 (2014) (citing Greggory S.
Blundell, Personal Computers in the Eighties, BYTE (Jan. 1983), at 168).
98.
See Laura Bernescu, When Is A Hack Not A Hack: Addressing the CFAA's
Applicability to the Internet Service Context, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 633, 637 (2013);
Joseph M. Olivenbaum, <Ctrl><Alt> <Delete>: Rethinking Federal Computer Crime
Legislation, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 574, 582 (1997); Schieck, supra note 97, at 831 (all
describing the history of personal computers and hacking in popular culture).
(Ironically, the movie War Games, rumored to have inspired Congress's legislation,
depicts a complacent teenager who spends much of his time procrastinating on video
games and on his computer, until one day, when he accidentally hacks into the United
States' military system and nearly launches a nuclear attack against Russia).
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Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CADCFAA), 99 imposed
criminal sanctions on hackers and other criminals who accessed
computers "without authorization."1 0 0
In proscribing computer fraud and use of counterfeit access
devices in the same act, Congress likened computer hacking to the
crimes of credit card fraud and identity theft.1 01 In 1986, Congress
passed the CFAA, 0 2 proscribing more anti-hacking conduct. 0 3 Due
to the basic understanding of computers and the internet when the
CFAA was enacted, the CFAA was amended numerous times between
1990 and 2001. Its most notable expansion was in 1994, when
Congress established a private right of action for individuals harmed
by certain violations of the CFAA.1 04
The majority of hacking crimes brought under the CFAA arise
under sections 1030(a)(2) and 1030(a)(4). Section 1030(a)(2), the
broadest provision of the statute, makes it unlawful for a person to
access intentionally "a computer without authorization" or to exceed
"authorized access" to obtain information belonging to a financial
institution or agency of the United States, or from any protected
computer. 0 5 Section 1030(a)(4) has a narrower focus and makes it
illegal for a person to "knowingly . . . access[] a protected computer
without authorization, or [to] exceed[] authorized access, and by
means of such conduct further[] the intended fraud and obtain[]
anything of value." 0 6
Data-breaching crimes are also covered under section 1030(a)(5),
which penalizes one who knowingly "causes the transmission of a
program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such
conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization to a
protected computer[,]" intentionally "accesses a protected computer
without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly
causes damage[,]" or intentionally "accesses a protected computer
without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes
damage and loss."

07

Sections 1030(a)(2), 1030(a)(4), and 1030(a)(5) all include either
the phrase "without authorization" or "exceeds authorized access."

99.
Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
100.
H.R. REP. No. 98-894 at 14-15 (1984).
101.
See id. at 4 ("[T]here are indications of a growing problem in counterfeit
credit cards and unauthorized use of account numbers or access codes to banking
system accounts. . . .").
Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,
102.
supra note 99.
103.
See generally S. REP. NO. 99-432 (1986).
104.
CFAA, supra note 12.
105.
Id. § 1030(a)(2)(A)-(C).
106.
Id. § 1030(a)(4).
107.
Id. § 1030(a)(5)(A)-(C).
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The phrase "exceeds authorized access" is defined in the statute as "to
access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain
or alter information in the computer that the accessor is not entitled
to so obtain or alter." However, the word "authorization" is nowhere
defined. Consequently, circuit courts have applied inconsistent
definitions of the term.108
1.

Narrow View of Authorization

The Ninth Circuit promulgated the narrow view of authorization
in the seminal case United States v. Nosal.109 In Nosal, employees of
an executive search firm obtained and passed along confidential
company information from their employer's database to a former
employee who was trying to set up a competing business. The court
held that, because the current employees had logged into the firm's
database with valid credentials, they did not violate the CFAA, even
though their ultimate use of the information did not align with the
purpose for which they had access. The court thus held that the
phrase "exceeds authorized access" requires hacking to be akin to
intentional trespass and does not refer to mere misuse of
information. 110
The Second Circuit recently joined the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
in adopting a narrow definition of authorization in United States v.
Valle."' That case involved a defendant who was an officer of the
New York Police Department (NYPD).11 2 As an NYPD employee, he
had access to restricted computer databases, which allowed him to
attain the home addresses and dates of birth of certain individuals.113
Despite the NYPD's clear policy that restricted use of this database to
conduct in the course of official job duties, Valle used this database to

108.
See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(holding that the phrase "exceeds authorized access" is limited to access restrictions,
not use restrictions); See Din, supra note 97, at 418-26; Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's
Scope: Interpreting 'Access" and 'Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1596 (2003). But see Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard
Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125, 1129 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (holding that
Shurgard lost authorization and breached the CFAA when he became an agent of a
direct competitor and used his employer's proprietary information in a way that
damaged his employer).
109.
See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863.
110.
Id. at 863-64 ("Therefore, we hold that 'exceeds authorized access' in the
CFAA is limited to violations of restrictions on access to information, and not
restrictions on its use.").
111.
United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015); Nosal, 676 F.3d at 864
(holding that the phrase "exceeds authorized access" is limited to access restrictions,
not use restrictions); WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013); LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka,
581 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2009).
112.
Valle, 807 F.3d at 512.
113.
Id. at 512-13.
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attain information on women about whom he fantasized torturing,
raping, and murdering. He then posted graphic descriptions about
these fantasies in internet chat rooms. 114
In deciding whether Valle "exceeded authorized access" under
the CFAA, the court focused on the rule of lenity, a canon of statutory
interpretation, which states that, when construing a criminal statute
with ambiguous language, after "seizing everything from which aid
can be derived," any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of a
defendant so as to not "penalize those whose conduct does not create
the risks of harm at which the statute aims."11 5 Because the court
concluded that the there was "doubt" as to whether the CFAA made
Valle's conduct unlawful, it had no choice but to apply the rule of
lenity, narrowly construe the statute in favor of Valle, and reverse his
CFAA conviction. 116
2.

Broad View of Authorization

In contrast to the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, the First,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted broad definitions of
authorization.11 7 This is largely because, ever since the CFAA's civil
liability provision was added in 1994, employers have increasingly
used section 1030(g) to bring disloyal employees into federal court. In
response, the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have adapted agency
theories, duty of loyalty theories, contract theories, and use-based
theories to find CFAA liability.
The duty of loyalty theory provides that authorization implicitly
ends as soon as an employee becomes disloyal to his/her employer,
even if he or she still has technical authorization. Thus, in
InternationalAirport Centers v. Citrin, the Seventh Circuit held that
an employee exceeded authorized access and therefore violated the
CFAA when, after deciding to go into business for himself, he erased
certain programs belonging to his former employer.1 1 8

114.
Id. at 512.
115.
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998).
116.
Valle, 807 F.3d at 527.
117.
See, e.g., United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1261-63 (11th Cir. 2010) United States v.
Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1078-79 (1st Cir. 1997).
118.
Once the employee breached his duty of loyalty to the company, he
terminated the agency relationship, and "with it his authority to access the laptop,
because the only basis of his authority had been that relationship." Int'l Airport Ctrs.,
L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Shurgard Storage Ctrs.,
Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1129 (W.D. Wash. 2000). In
Shurgard, the Western District of Washington held that Shurgard lost authorization
and breached the CFAA when he became an agent of a direct competitor and used his
employer's proprietary information in a way that damaged his employer.
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The contract-based interpretation of authorization provides that
if an individual acquires or utilizes information in breach of a written
policy, such as a confidentiality agreement, workplace rules of
conduct, or a terms-of-service agreement, then use of that information
is unauthorized under the CFAA. Therefore, in EF Cultural Travel
BV v. Explorica, Inc., the First Circuit held that a company likely
violated the CFAA when it used a computer robot to glean
information from its competitor because the breach of a binding
confidentiality agreement constituted a breach of authorization. 119
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have both employed an
"intended use" analysis. Under this theory, courts look at the
underlying purpose of certain company policies to determine whether
an employee breached or exceeded authorized access. The analysis is
broader than that under the contract theory, as it considers how
employees used information they obtained even if they did not
contravene a written policy or contract. Thus, in United States v.
John, the Fifth Circuit held that an employee violated the CFAA
when she used data from Citigroup's internal computer system to
obtain customer account information, which she then shared with a
third party in order to engage in fraudulent activity.12o The court
deduced that the company did not likely intend to permit such a use
when it granted her access. 121 Similarly, in United States v.
Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit held that an employee of the U.S.
Social Security Administration violated the CFAA when, in violation
of the agency's policy against the taking of information for nonbusiness purposes, he obtained confidential information from the
agency's computers such as the social security numbers, birthdates,
income, and home addresses of his former friends and co-workers for
personal use. 12 2
B.

InternationalFramework: The Tallinn Manual 2.0

The Tallinn Manual is a comprehensive manual authored by a
group of widely respected international law experts. It seeks to
develop a framework of international law applicable to cyber
warfare. 123 The second version of the manual (Tallinn Manual 2.0)
was released in February 2017.124 Supported by the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, the manual is
regarded as containing the most comprehensive analysis of how

119.
2001).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582-84 (1st Cir.
John, 597 F.3d at 270-74.
Id. at 272.
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260-63.
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 3.
Id.
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existing international law applies to cyber operations. 125 Although it
focuses on cyber operations that occur during armed conflict, the
framework of law applicable to cyberattacks that occur during
peacetime is also discussed. 2 6 The new edition analyzes the
applicable international legal principles to cyberattacks committed
against states, individuals, and companies.' 2 7
Section 1 outlines issues pertaining to state sovereignty,
jurisdiction, and control. This section posits that customary
international law applies to cyberspace.1 28 It also explains that, when
a cyberattack does not rise to the level of "use of force" as the term is
understood in the jus ad bellum context,1 29 the international legal
framework for cyber criminality is still unsettled.1 3 0
Rule 1 provides that states enjoy sovereignty over the cyber
infrastructure and activities within their sovereign territory and on
any territory that gives them control over cyber infrastructure and
cyber activities within their territory.'13
Because sovereignty
incorporates the limits set by treaties and customary international
law, cyber operations are understood as subject to state legal and
regulatory control. As such, a cyber operation directed at a structure
in another state violates the other state's sovereignty.' 3 2 Similarly,
cyber operations intended to coerce another government can
constitute a prohibited "intervention" under international law or a
prohibited "use of force."' 3 3 Certain attacks can even qualify as
"armed attacks," thereby triggering the right of individual or

125.

Tallinn

Manual:

Research,

NATO

COOPERATIVE

CYBER

DEFENSE,

https://ccdcoe.org/research.html [http://perma.cc/BCX3-244W] (archived Aug. 25, 2017).
126.
Id.
127.
InternationalLaw and Cyber Operations - Launch of the Tallinn Manual
2.0, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (2017), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/upcomingevents/detaillinternational-law-and-cyber-operations-launch-of-the-tallinn-manual-20
[http://perma.cclN7K6-TNKQ] (archived Aug. 25, 2017).
128.

TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 3, at 15.

129.
Jus ad bellum refers to the context in which States may resort to war or the
general use of armed forces.
130.
TALLINN MANUAL, supranote 3, at 4. The fact that many cyber-attacks that
occur today are state-sponsored, but do not occur during the course of armed conflict,
means that understanding cyber criminality in the jus ad bello is critical. For the same
reason, it is equally important to understand the implications of domestic frameworks
for prosecuting cybercrime since these mechanisms are increasingly employed against
state actors. See id. at 4.
131.
Id. at 15-16. Thus, any cyber infrastructure that a state can control from
sea or space falls within its sovereign territory. Id. at 16.
132.
Id. at 16.
133.
Id. at 17.

912

VANDERBILT ]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL 5o:889

collective self-defense. 13 4 Consequently, cyberattacks that violate
international law can entitle victim states to use countermeasures.13 5
Rule 2 provides that a state may exercise jurisdiction: a) over
persons engaged in cyber activities within its own territory, b) over
cyber infrastructure within its territory, and c) over persons and
with
accordance
in
extraterritorially,
cyber
infrastructure
international law.' 3 6 With regard to territorial jurisdiction, the
Manual provides that, although users of cyber infrastructure may
move, and even though some infrastructure may be located in a cloud,
a state has jurisdiction over any individual who conducts cyber
operations within that state.13 7 In addition, Rule 3 governs the
jurisdiction of flag states and Rule 4 governs sovereign immunity and
inviolability.13 8 These rules provide that a state waives any claims of
immunity over cyber structures that are used for both governmental
and private purposes. 39
The last rule in Section 1 is Rule 5. This rule provides that if a
state knowingly permits its territory to facilitate cyberattacks in
breach of other states' sovereign rights, then the host state is deemed
to have "controlled" that attack. 14 0 Rule 5 also establishes that any
cyberattack that broadly violates another country's domestic laws
violates international law.141 The duty to prevent a cyberattack,
however, is still unsettled in international law.1 42
Section 2, beginning with Rule 6, sets forth the rules governing
state responsibility and is therefore the most relevant section to
understand sovereign state attribution. Rule 6 provides that "a state
bears international legal responsibility for a cyber operation: a)
attributable to it and b) which constitutes a breach of an
international obligation."1 43 Within this framework, a state's failure
to act may also constitute a breach of international law.
Importantly, state responsibility under Rule 6 does not require
damage to be caused in the victim state.1 4 4 As such, if a state organ

134.
Id. Notably, there is no consensus yet whether a malware attack that
occurs in another country's territory but causes the other country no physical damage
constitutes a violation of the targeted state's sovereignty. Id. at 16.
135.
Id. at 17.
136.
Id. at 18.
137.
Id. at 19. The Manual also warns that even though geo-location technology
is constantly improving, the risk of spoofing the origin of a cyber-attack is real. Id.
138.
Id. at 21-23. The present Manual does not deal with diplomatic immunity
or immunity of government officials.
139.
See id. at 24.
140.
See id. at 26.
141.
See id. at 27.
142.
See id. This Section discusses the four levels of knowledge that determine
whether a state had "control" when an attack is perpetrated. See id. at 26-29.
143.
Id. at 29. Importantly, the Manual here explains that the prevailing
international legal attribution standard is very high and requires a sovereign state to
have "effective control" over the perpetrators of an attack. See id. at 32.
144.
See id. at 30.
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perpetrates an act, "[i]t does not matter whether that organ in
question acted in compliance with, beyond, or without any
instruction" from persons or entities outside those organs; a state is
responsible for a cyber act so long as the state "specifically
empowered" the actors.1 45 Similarly, this rule provides that, for
purposes of state control, the focus is not on the location where the
act in question takes place, but rather, on the state's level of
involvement in the act. 146
Rule 7 provides that it is not sufficient to attribute a cyber
operation to a particular state simply because an operation has been
launched or otherwise originates from governmental cyber
infrastructure within that state.1 47 Rather, the context of the entire
situation must be considered. This means that state attribution can
attach if, for example, patterns of non-state actors launch hacks that
serve state purposes. 14 8 Similarly, attribution principles must take
into account situations in which private or public actors are able to
spoof IP addresses and make it appear that a cyberattack originated
from a false point of origin.1 49 Rule 8 complements Rule 7 and
provides that the mere routing of a cyber operation through the cyber
infrastructure of a state is not sufficient evidence alone to attribute
that operation to the state through which the operation was
routed.15 0
Rule 9 governs countermeasures and provides that "[a] state
injured by an internationally wrongful act may resort to
proportionate countermeasures, including cyber countermeasures,
against the responsible state."1' 5 This rule is derived from Articles 22
and 49 to 53 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State
Responsibility.1 52 Although the Manual contains an additional ten
sections detailing rules related to the law of cyber armed conflict, the
details of such rules are beyond the scope of this Article and will not
be discussed. Rather, this Article will now discuss the European
Convention on Cybercrime.

145.
See id. at 31.
146.
See id. at 30-33.
147.
Id. at 34.
148.
See id. at 35.
149.
See id. For illustrative examples of IP spoofing used in connection with
cyberattacks, see generally Kozlowski, supra note 8.
150.
TALLINN MANUAL, supranote 3, at 36.
151.
Id.
152.
See Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/56/49 (2001).
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European Convention on Cybercrime

The European Convention on Cybercrime was passed in 2001
and entered into force in 2004.153 The first convention to address
Internet policy and cybercrime in a comprehensive manner, the
Convention seeks to foster cooperation with other state parties and
develop common rules and policies in order to protect societies
against cybercrime while facilitating the development of information
technologies.154

The Convention lists numerous substantive criminal offenses for
member and signatory states to incorporate into their domestic
legislation. These include, inter alia, intentional access to whole or
part of a computer system without right; illegal interception of
computer data to, from, or within a computer system; damaging,
deleting, deteriorating, altering, or suppressing computer data
without right; interfering with computer data; misusing vis-A-vis
procuring, importing, distributing, or possessing devices; committing
computer-related fraud or forgery; and committing offenses such as
distribution of child pornography and copyright infringement.15 5
Unlike the Tallinn Manual, this Convention focuses on common
domestic threats that result from transnational cybercriminal
conduct, regardless of who perpetrates such crimes. Based on the
crimes listed, it primarily seeks to facilitate cooperation in
combatting cybercrime committed by private actors located out-ofstate. The Convention does not target state-sponsored cybercrime,
and is less helpful in providing guidance to deter state-sponsored
cyberattacks. Nevertheless, the guide provides a useful framework for
identifying common cyber threats and the challenges connected to
cyberattacks such as the lack of extradition mechanisms, the need to
preserve endangered data, and the need to enact mutual assistance
procedures.

IV.

SHORTCOMINGS IN THE US DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK

With the above principles set forth, this Part discusses
shortcomings in the US domestic framework applicable to statesponsored cybercrime. Specifically, the next two subparts of this
Article discuss: (1) shortcomings with respect to achieving deterrence
and (2) foreign policy considerations which arise when seeking to
prosecute state actors for cybercrime under US law.

153.
See generally Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 4 (adopting a common
criminal policy to protect society against cybercrime).
Id.
154.
155.
Id. at 4-8.
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Achieving Deterrence

One of the main shortcomings with the use of domestic
legislation to prosecute state-sponsored cybercrime is that it is
unclear whether it deters cybercrime. In a paper entitled Deterring
Financially Motivated Cybercrime, Professors Zachary Goldman and
Damon McCoy write about many challenges of cyber deterrence that
are due to the unique nature of cyber space.15 6 They discuss problems
with "publicly attributing cyberattacks with confidence" and "the
unwillingness of states to discuss publicly capabilities that they treat
as highly classified."' 5 7 They also emphasize that motivations for
cyberattacks vary greatly and require tailored deterrence
strategies. 5 8 They further argue that the majority of cyberattacks
are "financially motivated cyberattacks"-that is, the attacks are
effectuated so that the perpetrators can generate a profit.1 59 Hence,
Goldman and McCoy argue that the best way to deter such attacks is
to make it harder for criminals to monetize the goods they have
counterfeited or data they have stolen.16o
Interestingly, McCoy and Goldman argue that in the case of the
PLA cyberattacks, the use of financial sanctions would have been
powerful regardless of whether the United States issued the
indictment.161 They contend that the United States is still uniquely
positioned to project financial power in a world in which the majority
of commercial transactions, including the global energy trade, are
conducted in US dollars.1 62 The potency of financial sanctions is due
to the fact that once the United States sanctions another government,
international financial institutions become wary of doing business
with that entity as a result of the reputational risks involved.i 63
Recall that although the PLA is a Chinese government entity,
the attacks were effectuated for the theft of industrial and nuclear
trade secrets, as opposed to direct regime change, as was the case in
the Russia-United States election hack. As such, the PLA hack was
more akin to the types of financially motivated cybercrimes
committed by rogue independent actors as opposed to the type of hack
one would associate with classic espionage. For state-sponsored
cyberattacks aimed against military targets or critical infrastructure,
McCoy and Goldman acknowledge that financial sanctions are less

156.
See generally Zachary K. Goldman & Damon McCoy, DeterringFinancially
Motivated Cybercrime, 8 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 595, 595-619 (2016).
157.
Id. at 595.
158.
Id. at 595-596.
159.
Id. at 596.
160.
See id. at 597.
161.
See id. at 603-605.
162.
See id. at 603.
163.
See id.
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likely to be effective in most instances and that alternative deterrence
tools are required. 164
Ultimately, any effective deterrence strategy must increase the
perceived costs and lower the perceived benefits of engaging in a
particular criminal activity. 165 That begs the question of how the US
government came to believe that issuing indictments under the CFAA
for hacks that were believed to be state-sponsored would affect the
cost/benefit calculations of the sovereign state actors who ordered
them. On that point, it is important to note that an indictment is only
one tool in the arsenal of deterrence which the United States has
employed against state actors who engaged in cybercriminal activity
against it. Other tools the United States has (sparingly) used in lieu
of issuing an indictment include diplomatic and/or economic sanctions
and cyber and/or military retaliation against a perpetrator.
For example, in response to Russia's interference in the US
presidential election, then President Obama expelled thirty-five
Russian diplomats from the United States, imposed financial
sanctions on Russia's intelligence services, its top officers, and
various companies and organizations complicit in the attack, and
ordered the closure of two Russian diplomatic compounds. 166 He also
signed an executive order allowing himself and any future president
to retaliate further against the Russian government for its
interference in the US election or for any interference perpetrated
against US allies. Such retaliation was stated as being likely
"covert . . . , one that would be obvious to Mr. Putin but not to the
public."1 67
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of any deterrence strategy
requires the imposition of such a high cost on an adversary that the
adversary decides "not to act aggressively."1 6 8 Measured against this
standard, the United States' response to Russia's actions against it in
the 2016 election (or for that matter any of the state-sponsored
cyberattacks outlined in Part I) has not proven successful. This is
because Russia and other state actors continue to engage in

164.
See id. at 597.
165.
See generally id. Goldman and McCoy highlight Patrick Morgan's
formulation of deterrence: "deterrence has generally been conceived as an effort by one
actor to convince another to not attack by using threats of a forceful response to alter
the other's cost-benefit calculations." PATRICK MORGAN, DETERRENCE Now 44 (2003).
166.
David E. Sanger, Obama Strikes Back at Russia for Election Hacking, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/us/politics/russia-electionhacking-sanctions.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cclBCH8-WQV9] (archived Aug. 29,
2017).
167.
Id.
168.
See Will Goodman, Cyber Deterrence: Tougher in Theory than in Practice,
STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 107 (2010).
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significant cyber operations against the United States and its
allies.169
Applying this basic fact to traditional theories of deterrence
reveals an inevitable conclusion: The United States needs to increase
the costs of cyber aggression against it such that the actual and/or
perceived costs outweigh the benefits of any future attacks. Given the
narrow range of options currently present, and given the reality of
increasingly frequent and potent cybercriminal conduct, indictments
without actual extradition and punishment, although helpful, are not
going to alter the activities of state actors. This leaves the United
States with a series of least good alternatives.
First, it can simply accept that such attacks are an inherent part
of the new national security order requiring the devotion of
significant resources to cyber-defensive strategies designed to ensure
that such attacks are less likely to result in a successful outcome.
Given the rapidly evolving cat-and-mouse nature of aggressive cyber
activities, such an approach would need to accept a certain
percentage of failure as it is likely impossible that any defensive
strategy will prevent all future attacks from occurring.
Second, the United States can retaliate against perpetrators of
cyberattacks by deploying its offensive cyber capabilities in a manner
that is so overwhelming to the attacker that any future attackers
recognize that engaging in such activities will result in tremendous
cost to it. This approach is also fraught with difficulty because any
such activity will likely result in the disclosure of US cyber assets
which in turn will lead to countermeasures against those assets
making them ineffective in the future. 170 Moreover, recent news
reports reflect that the United States lags behind certain states, such
as Israel, with regards to its cyber expertise, and even rogue criminal

169.
Although certain United States officials assert that Chinese hacking
against United States targets decreased immediately after the 2014 indictment was
issued, recent news reports tend to show that on the aggregate, the frequency of global
cyber-attacks has only increased in recent months. See Vindu Goel & Eric Lichtblau,
Russian Agents were Behind Yahoo Hack, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (March 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/technology/yahoo-hack-indictment.html?mcubz=0
[https://perma.cc/5RFH-WSPH] (archived Aug. 29, 2017); Lohr & Alderman, supra note
8; see also supra text accompanying note 8.
170.
Such efforts would also likely be of little avail because in addition to the
United States risking full disclosure of its cyber weaponry, cyber actors, including
Islamic State fighters for example, are so mobile that they reconfigure their cyber
communication strategies with high frequency. David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, U.S.
Cyberweapons, Used Against Iran and North Korea, Are a Disappointment Against
ISIS,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
12,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/world/middleeast/isis-cyber.html?_r=0
[https://perma.ccKLM4-C7Y7] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
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groups, such as the Islamic State, have recently found ways to evade
the efforts of US cyber experts.1 71
Third, the United States could impose diplomatic or economic
sanctions against a perpetrator, which may have limited effect. In the
case of the Russia-United States election hack, the United States
implemented a combination of economic and diplomatic sanctions. In
addition, the indictments that the United States issued in the other
three instances discussed in Part I were akin to diplomatic sanctions,
insofar as they resulted in the same type of naming and shaming that
diplomatic sanctions effectuate. To date, there is no clear sign that
these indictments or any other diplomatic sanctions issued during the
election hack have slowed down cyber activities. And in fact, recent
reports tend to reflect that the opposite is true. 172
Fourth, the United States can deploy actual military force
against the perpetrators of cyber aggression against it provided that
any such use of force qualifies as self-defense under Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter and otherwise complies with international
law. Given the legal and foreign policy implications of using force
against the perpetrators of cyber aggression, this should be a
consideration of last resort and only turned to when the cyber
aggression at issue is of such magnitude that it would qualify as an
armed attack under Article 51 and other measures would be
unsuccessful. On this point, it is important to remember that what
type of "cyberattack" qualifies as an armed attack in the jus ad
bellum is still subject to debate in the international legal
community.' 7 3 As it could be a while before a global consensus is
reached as to what types of cyberattacks rise to the level of an armed
attack and are legally sufficient to trigger a right of self-defense, the
premature use of self-defense measures (cyber or otherwise) should be
avoided because of its high costs.

174

171.
See id. (discussing the failures and successes of cyber weapons used against
ISIS, mainly focusing on why ISIS proves to be a more difficult target of cyberattacks
than Iran, which began to be targeted under the Bush administration).
172.
See supra text accompanying note 8.
173.
Although the Tallinn Manual and The Tallinn Manual 2.0 attempt to fill in
definitional holes and address the types of cyber operations which are the most severe
violations of international law and which are more innocuous, the manuals are replete
with references to the many cyber operations over which international consensus has
yet to be reached.
174.
See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley
Nix, Aileen Nowlan, William Perdue & Julia Spiegel, The Law of Cyber-Attack, Faculty
Scholarship Series (2012), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?
article=4844&context=fss-papers [https://perma.cc/87NW-76DU] (archived Aug. 29,
2017) (calling for a consensus as to the definitions of cyber-attack, cyber-crime, and
cyber-warfare).
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Foreign Policy Implications

As just noted, indictments and diplomatic sanctions alone will
unlikely alter a state's calculations when deciding whether to conduct
cyber operations against the United States. Having said that,
indictments do carry with them foreign policy impacts, a topic that
this Article next explores. First, this Article explores the foreign
policy impacts that might arise if US courts were to apply its
domestic cybercriminal framework extraterritorially. Second, it
discusses the competing tests required to attribute any such
cybercriminal activity to a state actor and the foreign policy
implications of doing so.
1.

Impact of Applying Domestic Laws Extraterritorially

Chief among these foreign policy implications is the risk that
prosecutors overreach in the application of US domestic laws, such
that they infringe upon another state's sovereignty. For example, the
United States Supreme Court is now reviewing a July 2016, decision
in the widely publicized case Microsoft Corp. v. United States where
the Second Circuit held it unlawful for a US magistrate judge to issue
a warrant, pursuant to the Stored Communications Act (SCA), to
attain emails that were stored on a server located in Ireland.' 7 5
The case arose when a prosecutor for the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) made a request to Magistrate Judge James Francis IV
for a search warrant to be issued against Microsoft Corporation.1 76
The DOJ presented probable cause to believe that a Microsoft-based
email account, located on a server in Ireland, was being used in
furtherance of narcotics trafficking. 1 " In analyzing whether the SCA
could be employed extraterritorially, the Second Circuit focused on
the Supreme Court's recent holdings in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Cmty. 78 and Morrison v. National Australian Bank.' 7 9
Both of these Supreme Court cases bolstered the presumption against
extraterritoriality-the notion that "[w]hen interpreting the laws of
the United States, [courts] presume that legislation of Congress 'is

175.
See generally Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016);
see also Myra F. Din, Data Without Borders: Resolving ExtraterritorialData Disputes,
26 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2017). On October 16, 2017, the United
States Supreme Court granted the Department of Justice's Petition for Certiorari. See
Order List: 583 US (Oct. 16, 2017) https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/
101617zr_6k37.pdf [https://perma.cclVL6M-N7BD] (archived Oct. 29, 2017).
176.
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
177.
Id.
178.
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
179.
Morrison v. Nat'1 Australian Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
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meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States,' unless a contrary intent clearly appears."1 80
The Second Circuit therefore engaged in a two-part inquiry laid
out in Morrison to assess whether the SCA could either be read as
extraterritorial or applied in such a manner. 18 1 First, the court
ascertained that the relevant statutory provisions did not expressly
"contemplate extraterritorial application." 182 Second, the court
assessed the statute's "focus" to determine whether in light of the
statute's intended purpose and structure, and based on the facts
presented in the case, application of the statute would be
impermissibly extraterritorial.1 8 3 Ultimately, the Second Circuit held
that the SCA could neither be read nor applied in an extraterritorial
manner as the district court had permitted.
A key takeaway from Microsoft is that, although the underlying
narcotics trafficking may have been committed within the United
States, the prosecutor's requested extraterritorial application of the
SCA was of greater concern. This takeaway lies in contrast to the
long-standing objective territorial jurisdiction principle contained in
international law, which provides that a sovereign can generally
exercise jurisdiction over persons who engage in criminal conduct
outside of the sovereign's borders when those acts produce
"substantial detrimental effects" within the sovereign's borders. 184
Nevertheless, in Microsoft the court effectively held that this
principle did not apply where the foreign link was merely stored
communications related to the underlying domestic crime, regardless
of how intertwined they were.
For purposes of prosecuting state-sponsored cybercrime under
the CFAA and similar domestic statutes as was laid out in the PLA,
Iran, and Russia (Yahoo) indictments, the implications of Microsoft
(assuming the Supreme Court upholds the Second Circuit's decision)
are twofold. If an investigation were to continue beyond the issuance
of indictments, a court would need to assess whether the CFAA
applied extraterritorially and whether, considering the Second
Circuit's interpretation of the SCA, US prosecutors could attain
digital evidence stored abroad without violating the presumption
against extraterritoriality.
This second concern is especially
important because, as the numerous amicus briefs from Microsoft

180.
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 210 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255).
181.
Id. at 209-10.
182.
Id. at 210-11.
183.
Id. at 210, 216.
184.
Edward Carter, Examining Cybercrime: Tactics for Investigation and
Prosecution, 99 n.23 (2002), pb.univd.edu.ua/?controller=service&action=download&
download=25257 (citing United States v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d 601, 603 (E.D. La.
1998)); see also Andrew Clapham, BRIERLY'S LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 242-47 (Oxford

University Press 7th Ed. 2012).
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indicated, a US prosecutor's unilateral seizure of evidence located
abroad through a US court order could cause that other state to
retaliate against the United States. This could include the imposition
of sanctions or trade restrictions, the suspension of judicial, military,
economic, or other cooperation, or the seizure by that state of
information located here, any of which could have a deleterious
impact on the US economy and/or foreign policy.185
Indeed, on October 6, 2015, just about one year after the district
court affirmed the extraterritorial email warrant's issuance (and
about ten months before the Second Circuit reversed that decision),
the European Court of Justice issued a milestone decision in
Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner.186 That
decision struck down the "safe harbor" provisions between a
multitude of US digital services providers and EU member countries
on the basis that the United States was not providing "adequate
protection" of EU members' personal data.1 87 Some viewed this
decision as retaliation for the United States' decision to infringe Irish
sovereignty in Microsoft, as the European Court of Justice decision
resulted in companies such as Facebook, Google, Amazon, and
thousands of other smaller businesses having to renegotiate their
contracts and data protection policies in order to preserve their
European consumer base.18 8

185.
Numerous amici filed briefs in the Microsoft litigation to explain how an
over-application of U.S. law could infringe Ireland's sovereignty and negatively harm
foreign relations. See, e.g., Brief for Apple as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at
21-22, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2016) (No. 14-2985); Brief for Brennan Center for
Justice at NYU School of Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 14, In re
Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 829 F.3d at 197; Brief for Anthony J. Colangelo, International Law Scholar as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 11-12, In re Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 197 (describing
how the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are well-established under
customary international law and preclude one state from exercising law enforcement
jurisdiction in the territory of another state); Brief for Digital Rights Ireland Limited et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 16-18, In re Warrant to Search a Certain
E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 197; Brief for
Ireland as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 3-4, In re Warrant to Search a

Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 197
(arguing that national sovereignty is never waived by non-intervention in foreign
domestic court proceedings and endorsing application of the MLAT process in order to
avoid conflicts as much as possible).
186.
Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner,
EU:C:2015:627 (Judgment of the Court).
187.
Id. T 107.
188.
See, e.g., Natalia Drozdiak and Sam Schechner, EU Court Says DataTransfer Pact With U.S. Violates Privacy, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 6, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-court-strikes-down-trans-atlantic-safe-harbor-datatransfer-pact- 1444121361 [https://perma.cc/6XAH-JGMR] (archived Sep. 27, 2017);
Mark Scott, Data Transfer Pact Between U.S. and Europe if Ruled Invalid, N.Y. TIMES
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Costs Connected with Attribution

A second challenge that implicates foreign sovereignty is the
issue of attribution, a subject which scholars and jurists have long
debated.1 89 For this reason, a critical development in international
law involved the codification of rules for state responsibility in the
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
(ARSIWA), which is now generally accepted as representing
customary international law.19 0 Under the ARSIWA, a state is
responsible for all the acts of its organs, which include the executive
branch, legislature, judiciary, and armed forces.
In contrast, the conduct of private persons or entities is generally
not attributable to states other than in select instances in which a
sufficient factual "link" exists between the person or entity engaging
in the conduct and the state. What types of links are sufficient for
private conduct to be deemed state-sponsored is crucial to attribute
cybercrime to a state, where there is often an unapparent connection
between cyber conduct and its effects.19 1
Article 8 of ARSIWA explains when acts that are not effectuated
by state organs may be attributed to a state:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a
State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting
on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of that State in carrying
192
out the conduct.

Consequently, a state may assume responsibility for conduct by
either 1) issuing specific directions or 2) exercising sufficient "control"
over a group. While situations in which a state issues instructions or
directions are relatively clear, instances in which states have been
responsible for the conduct of non-state actors who were deemed to be
(Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/technology/european-union-usdata-collection.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/E5WN-4DR7] (archived Sep. 27, 2017);
Mark Scott, U.S. and Europe in 'Safe Harbor'Data Deal, but Legal Fight May Await,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/technology/us-europesafe-harbor-data-deal.html [https://perma.cc/USU7-Y2G5] (archived Sep. 27, 2017).
189.
See, e.g., The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at
18 (Apr. 9); The Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at
18-26 (Sep. 7). Both of these were monumental contentious international law cases
that hinged upon state attribution issues. Ultimately, they established the legal
foundations for when states may be held responsible for conduct that occurs outside of
their sovereign borders and the evidentiary burdens that must be met for state
attribution to lie.
190.
See generally G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 10 (delineating the many
circumstances in which States can be held responsible for internationally wrongful
acts).
191.
See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L. J. 326,
365-66 (2015) (describing how the unique properties of data, such as its mobility,
divisibility, unpredictability, and interconnectedness create fragmentation between the
location of data and its effects); Din, supra note 175.
192.
G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 10, at art. 8.
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under state control are murkier, and international courts have
applied varying definitions of control.
Because misattributing cyberattacks and cyber espionage to
sovereign states carries grave consequences, the international legal
community recently began to apply a higher standard of "control"
before attributing the actions of an independent actor to a state. In
the past, however, international courts were wary of employing too
high a standard of control, as such a standard could result in the
failure to attribute sovereign sponsored conduct to states at all. This,
in turn, would have allowed states to commit grave crimes with
impunity. This risk is exacerbated in the cyber context where
directions are much harder to detect due to the amorphous and
fragmented nature of digital communications that can be invisible to
the naked eye and disconnected from the location at which
cyberattacks occur.193 As such, this Article will next discuss the
competing standards for control under international law and explain
the implications of using US domestic laws for attributing cyber
conduct to state actors.
a. Effective (Operational) Control
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) promulgated the
effective control standard in The Case Concerning Military and
ParamilitaryActivities in and against Nicaragua.194 In that case, the
ICJ had to decide if human rights violations committed by the
Contras, a rebel group fighting the Nicaraguan army, could be
attributed to the United States. The question of attribution arose
because the United States had financed and given the Contras
logistical and military support.1 95 The ICJ considered that, while the
United States had not created the Contras, it had played a significant
role in assisting their efforts. Ultimately, however, the ICJ held that
the conduct of the Contras was not attributable to the United States
because "a country's control over paramilitaries or other non-State

193.
See Daskal supra note 191; Din, supra note 175; Kozlowski, supra note 8
("The Georgian authorities in the wake of massive disruption of Internet websites
firstly tried to filter Russian IP addresses but the Russian[s] very quickly changed
their tactic[s] and used non-Russian servers."); David E. McNabb, Russia's Undeclared
Cyber Wars, INFO. SECURITY TODAY, http://www.infosectoday.com/Articles/UndeclaredCyber-Wars.htm#.WT7qplXytyw [https://perma.cc/M8KU-DAW7] (archived Aug. 29,
2017) (describing instances in which Russian employed IP spoofing and other
cyberattacks against Lithuania, Estonia, and Georgia).
194.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 18 (June 27).
195.

Id.
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actors can only be established if the actors in questions act in
'complete dependence' on the State."19 6
b. Overall Control
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) took a different approach in Prosecutorv. Tadic.19 7 There, the
ICTY had to determine whether it had jurisdiction over Dusko Tadic,
who was charged with committing crimes against humanity, violating
the Geneva Conventions, and violating the customs of war in various
Serb-run concentration camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina.1 9 8 Jurisdiction
over Dusko depended upon whether his acts were attributable to a
state.1 9 9 The ICTY employed a lower attribution standard than the
ICJ in Nicaraguaholding that "where a state has a role in organizing
and coordinating, in addition to providing support for a group, it has
sufficient overall control, and the group's acts are attributable to the
State." 200
c. Prevailing Test
The ICJ had to revisit this issue in the Application of the
Genocide Convention (Bosnian Genocide case), nearly a decade after
Tadic.20 1 Upon reviewing both the effective and overall control
standards for state attribution, the ICJ reiterated that the effective
control standard promulgated in Nicaragua was appropriate. 202 The
ICJ, in reaffirming the effective control test for state attribution,
required that a non-state actor be a "de facto organ" of the state. This
ruling is also important from an evidentiary perspective because it
required the equivalent of "smoking gun" evidence-or proof beyond
any doubt-for state attribution to attach. 20 3
In discussing state responsibility, the Tallinn Manual
acknowledges the validity of the Articles on State Responsibility as

196.

Scott J. Shackelford, State Responsibility For Cyber Attacks: Competing

Standards For A Growing Problem, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION [NATO],
COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENSE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE 197, 201 (2010); see Military

and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 194.
197.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-ar72, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
198.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 1 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
199.
Id.
200.
Shackelford, supra note 196 (emphasis added); see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 122 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15,
1999).
201.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 2007,
p. 43, ¶ 402 (Feb. 26).
202.
Id.
203.
Id.; Shackelford, supranote 196, at 201.
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codifying customary international law and articulates the competing
standards for state control as articulated in the Nicaraguaand Tadic
cases. 204 The Manual further distinguishes instances in which private
citizens conduct cyber operations on their own initiative (such as
"hacktivists" or "patriotic hackers"), from instances in which military
or other organized groups engage in acts that may violate
international law, such as in the case of the Contras.20 5 However,
while the Manual acknowledges that there is a split in the standard
that governs state control over military or group actions, it implies
that at least in the case of individuals or groups not organized into
military structures, the higher standard for control applies, and a
state "needs to have issued specific instructions or directed or
controlled a particular operation to engage State responsibility." 206
Each of the three indictments discussed in Part I of this Article
highlights the foreign policy implications that arise when a state
suffering from such malfeasance attributes that malfeasance to
another state, regardless of the test used. For example, the Chinese
government suspended high-level diplomatic talks regarding cyber
activities after the PLA indictment was issued and also summoned
the US ambassador over the hacking charges.2 07 Similarly, the Iran
hack was itself said to be retaliatory in nature, conducted as
retribution for an American led cyberattack against Iran's main
nuclear enrichment plant.20 8 To avoid escalating global tensions
further, prosecutors carefully refrained from alleging that the IRGC
directed the Iran attacks, instead alleging merely that the defendants
performed work on behalf of the Iranian government, including the
IRGC. And the diplomatic fallout from the Russian election and
Yahoo hacks (along with the accompanying indictment) continue to
cause severe tension between the United States and Russia, 209 albeit

204.

See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER

WARFARE, supra note 3, at 29-34.
205.
Id. at 33.
206.
See id.
207.
Ellen Nakashima & William Wan, U.S. Announces First Charges Against
Foreign Country in Connection with Cyberspying, WASH. POST (May 19, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-to-announce-first-

criminal-charges-against-foreign-country-for-cyberspying/2014/05/19/586c9992-df4511e3-810f-764fe58b82d story.html [https://perma.cc/EN6W-VTSG] (archived Aug. 29,
2017).
208.
Id.
209.
On June 22, 2017, the US Congress reached agreement to impose
additional sanctions on Russia because of its interference in the 2016 election. See Matt
Flegenheimer & David E. Sanger, Congress Reaches Deal on Russia Sanctions, Setting
2017),
22,
(July
TIMES
N.Y.
Trump,
for
Choice
Tough
up
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/22/us/politics/congress-sanctions-russia.html
(subscription required) [https://perma.cclJVV3-PH7D] (archived Aug. 29, 2017). In
response, Russia ordered 755 US diplomats to cease their work. See Neil MacFarquhar,
Putin, Responding to Sanctions, Orders U.S. to Cut Diplomatic Staff by 755, N.Y.
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without any
behavior. 2 10

V.

accompanying

alterations

or

changes

to

Russia's

SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE OR OTHER PROPOSALS

Part III of this Article explained how the US domestic legal
framework is not effective at imposing sufficient cost on a statesponsored perpetrator of cybercrime so as to deter it from future
transgressions. Additionally, Part III touched upon the foreign policy
challenges that attach when seeking to indict and prosecute
individuals who perpetrate such acts on behalf of a state sovereign.
The following sections of this Article argue that the United States
needs to modify the framework applicable to such crimes to deter
states more effectively from engaging in such acts in the future.
Specifically, the final sections of the article argue that Congress
should (i) permit its domestic statutes to apply extraterritorially and
(ii) pass a statute that exposes sovereign state perpetrators of such
acts to civil liability.
A.

ExtraterritorialApplication of CFAA and SCA

Self-evidently, ambiguity regarding the extraterritorial reach of
the CFAA and SCA requires resolution. Specifically, Congress should
incorporate
language
explicitly
incorporating
extraterritorial
application of these two statutes much as Congress has done with
other statutes that are used to combat transnational crimes such as
the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the wire
fraud statute, and other similar type statutes. As the Supreme Court
noted in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., when analyzing
whether RICO applied extraterritorially, a clear indication of
Congress's intent for a statute to have extraterritorial effect is
21
sufficient for a court to apply it as such. 1
Confirming the CFAA's extraterritorial reach will ensure that
state sovereign actors who are nearly always working abroad and
who are charged with violating the CFAA will be denied the ability to
challenge the statute's applicability to their actions. This issue may
become immediately pressing as one of the named defendants in the

TIMES (July 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/worldleurope/trumprussia-sanctions.html (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/A4YD-W5PG] (archived
Aug. 29, 2017). President Trump signed the Russia sanctions bill into law on August 2,
2017. See Peter Baker & Sophia Kishkovsky, Trump Signs Russian Sanctions into
Law,
with
Caveats,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
2,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/30/world/europe/
russia-sanctions-us-diplomatsexpelled.html (subscription required) [https://perma.cclZVK8-7MD8] (archived Aug. 29,
2017).
210.
See Goel & Lichtblau, supra note 169.
211.
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101-03 (2016).
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Russia election and Yahoo hacks, Karim Baratov, was recently
arrested in Canada. Should Canada extradite him to the United
States, it can be expected that his attorneys will file a legal challenge
based on the extraterritorial reach of the CFAA which, if resolved in
his favor, could undercut prosecutorial efforts to hold him
accountable.
Congress should also include similarly clear language in the
SCA. Doing this will overcome evidentiary issues that could arise if
the government requires evidence stored on a server located abroad
as occurred in the Microsoft case. As Judge Gerald Lynch explained
in that case, the lack of any such language yields unfair results.
Specifically, a service provider's decision to store emails in another
country, whether for cost or other reasons, can now defeat the
"government's demand" for such emails, notwithstanding that such
emails are needed to prosecute criminal activity occurring here.2 12
This result is even more unfair considering that such storage is
merely virtual as computer files can be fragmented and stored across
many servers, and because service provider employees in the United
States are capable in the ordinary course of business-and without
ever leaving their desks-to review such data. Accordingly, the SCA
as drafted imposes an unfair penalty on criminal prosecutors so long
as the Supreme Court does not alter this interpretation and the
statute is deemed applicable only to files held domestically.
Of course, any alterations to either the text or judicial
interpretation of the CFAA or SCA which confirms their
extraterritorial reach are bound to have foreign policy implications as
applied to specific acts. But that is not unusual. Consider the pending
prosecution of members F6d6ration Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA) by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern
District of New York for corruption. Despite critiques of the United
States for overreaching in the application of its laws 2 13 and for acting
as a "world police," the case proceeds apace with little diplomatic
fallout for the simple reason that the "world is not insular to a
particular country any longer." 21 4

212.
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained
by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 224 (2016) (No. 14-2985).
213.
Jon Sopel, Fifa scandal:Is the long arm of US law now overreaching?, BBC
(June
4
2015),
http://www.bbc.cominews/world-us-canada-33011847
[https://perma.cc/FP7Z-4X5Q] (archived Aug. 29, 2017); Raymond J. de Souza,
America's
Prosecutorial Overreach,
NAT'L
POST
(June
10,
2015),
http://nationalpost.com/opinionlfather-raymond-j-de-souza-why-is-the-u-s-prosecutingfifa-over-corruption-scandals-that-largely-took-place-elsewhere (subscription required)
[https://perma.cc/AHN3-DM8P] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
214.
Everett Rosenfeld, Why the FIFA case is being prosecuted in the US, CNBC
(May 27, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/27/why-fifa-is-being-prosecuted-in-theus.html [https://perma.cc/H8FY-8KMR] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
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This argument applies even more forcefully in the cybercrime
context and also serves a deterrent effect. Bluntly put, if Chinese
hackers associated with the PLA or Russian hackers associated with
the FSB are indicted and such governments are made aware that
evidence pertaining to their actions, which are stored on
commercially available servers outside the United States, are subject
to seizure, then the costs for engaging in such activities rise. This is
so because the seizure and publication of such evidence in the form of
an indictment can result in diplomatic pressures on an aggressor
country and the development of countermeasures by victims of such
attacks when they are made aware of how the original attack
occurred.
B.

Removal of Sovereign Immunity for State Sponsors of Cyber
Crime

"

Congress should also consider amending the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) or otherwise passing special legislation to
permit civil litigants to file claims directly against a state implicated
in a cyberattack. Such an approach may seem outlandish, but it has
precedent. In 2016, Congress overrode a presidential veto to pass a
bill entitled the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act
(JASTA). 215 JASTA provides a private right of action against state
sponsors of terrorism. 216 More specifically, it authorizes federal court
jurisdiction over civil claims against a foreign state for physical injury
to a person or property or death that occurs inside the United States
as a result of an act of international terrorism or a tort committed
anywhere by an official, agent, or employee of a foreign state acting
2
within the scope of his or her employment.
When the bill was debated, Saudi Arabia protested vigorously as
its passage allowed the continuation of a longstanding civil suit
brought by victims of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks against
Saudi Arabia. 218 In fact, Saudi Arabia threatened to destabilize the
US economy by selling up to $750 billion in US securities if the bill
passed. 2 19 Likewise, the U.S. Department of State warned that the

215.
18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2012).
216.
Id.
217.
Id.
218.
See, e.g., Callum Paton, Saudi Arabia Paid Veterans to Lobby Congress
Against
9/11
Lawsuit
Bill,
NEWSWEEK
(May
11,
2017),
http://www.newsweek.com/saudi-arabia-paid-veterans-lobby-congress-against-91 1lawsuit-law-607655 [bittps://perma.cc/66FG-5JFH] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
219.
See Mark Mazzetti, Saudi Arabia Warns of Economic Fallout if Congress
Passes 9/11 Bill, N.Y. TIMES (April 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/
world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-warns-ofeconomic-fallout-if-congress-passes-9- 11bill.html?_r=0 (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/FM73-BEMZ] (archived Aug.
29, 2017); Larry McShane, Saudi Arabia Threatens to Pull $750B from U.S. Economy if
Congress Allows them to be Sued for 9/11 Terror Attacks, DAILY NEWS (April 16, 2016),
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bill's passage could cause other states to pass similar measures
abrogating sovereign immunity defenses of the United States for
drone strikes or other foreign economic, military, or diplomatic
activity which caused harm. 220 Although Saudi Arabia never followed
through on its threats, it continues to lobby heavily to amend JASTA
and restore the protections it previously enjoyed as a sovereign
state. 221
Applying the JASTA model to sovereign state perpetrators of
cybercrimes would likely be far less controversial from a foreign
policy and legal perspective for a variety of reasons. This is so
because JASTA was widely understood as specifically targeting Saudi
Arabia, whereas removing sovereign immunity defenses for state
sponsors of cybercrime would apply generally to any state.
Furthermore, customary international law, as codified in the FSIA,
already strips away sovereign immunity defenses for state actions
that qualify as: (a) commercial activities performed in the United
States; (b) an act performed by a state in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity outside the United States; or
(c) an act performed by a state outside the United States in
connection with a commercial activity outside the United States but
which causes a direct effect in the United States. 222 This is important
because a host of state-sponsored criminal activity directed against
the United States arguably qualifies as commercial in nature, such as
occurred when the PLA hacked US commercial entities and stole
their trade secrets ostensibly to benefit Chinese competitors, meaning
that the passage of a law removing a state's claim of sovereign
immunity for such actions would arguably fall within existing law.
Take the PLA hack. If Westinghouse, Alcoa, or any of the other
victims of that incident could file a civil cause of action against China
directly for theft of their trade secrets, which went to benefit Chinese
competitors, they could recover significant damages which would (in
turn) raise the cost benefit analysis future hackers would undertake

http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/saudi-arabia-warns-750b-response-9-11liability-suit-article-1.2603675 (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/4ET7-MBSS]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017).
220.
162 CONG. REC. 147, at 19 (Sept. 28, 2016) (Justice Against Sponsors Of
Terrorism Act-Veto Message From The President Of The United States),
https://www.congress.gov/crec/20 16/09/28/CREC-2016-09-28.pdf.
[https://perma.cclUQD4-M3FN] (archived Aug. 29, 2017); See Mazzetti, supranote 219.
221.
Bruce Riedel, What JASTA Will Mean for U.S.-Saudi Relations,
BROOKINGS (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/10/03/whatjasta-will-mean-for-u-s-saudi-relations/ [https://perma.cc/S4A4-GZPQ] (archived Aug.
29, 2017); Ananya Sreekanth, Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: The Bad and
the Ugly, BERK. POL. REV. (Nov. 14, 2016); see also Lee Fang, As Trump Travels to
Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom's D.C. Lobbying Surge is Paying Off, THE INTERCEPT (May
19, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/05/19/as-trump-travels-to-saudi-arabia-thekingdoms-d-c-lobbying-surge-is-paying-offl.
222.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012).
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before deciding to launch future attacks. On the negative side,
however, it could be presumed that other states would pass similar
legislation which could be directed towards deterring aggressive cyber
espionage activities of the United States. 223 But that is not
necessarily a negative outcome, as a mutual deterrence legal regime
broadly directed against a variety of state actors could militate
against the continued perpetration of such attacks in the future.
Of course, opening the courthouse doors to civil litigants who
suffer when a state perpetrates a cyberattack for purely commercial
reasons is different from the situation when a state perpetrates such
an attack for political or other noncommercial reasons. That said, this
approach could prove attractive for policy makers given that the
alternative solutions are (as explained above): (1) to do nothing except
strengthen cyber defenses; (2) institute a counter cyberattack against
a perpetrator; (3) impose diplomatic or economic sanctions against a
perpetrator; or (4) use military force against a perpetrator. Stated
differently, if Russia's actions in the Yahoo attack were not purely
commercial but its actions were still subject to civil penalties in the
United States, its calculus in launching such an attack might change.
Similarly, Congress can set the threshold level of attribution
required for liability to attach in any such legislation. In so doing,
Congress could harmonize the holdings in Nicaragua and Tadic by
establishing a standard of attribution flexible enough to account for
the amorphous nature of how states perpetrate cyberattacks yet
robust enough to satisfy those instances when attribution truly
cannot be determined. At a minimum, by equipping the United States
with such a statutory remedy, when combined with more traditional
responses, it is at least theoretically possible that the instances of
such cyberattacks would be decreased and/or that the victims of such
attacks located here would recover some form of compensation for
their losses.

VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has provided an overview of instances in which
sovereign states have perpetrated cybercrimes against the United
States. This Article also has set forth the domestic legal framework
applicable to the prosecution of such crimes. After opining that the
current legal framework does little to deter states from engaging in
such attacks, this Article argues that: (1) the CFAA and SCA should
either be modified or interpreted to apply extraterritorially, and (2)
Congress should provide civil litigants a private right of action
against state sovereign perpetrators of cybercrimes. If these
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recommendations were adopted, it by no means assure that such
activity would decrease or that state actors would find themselves
deterred from committing such acts in the future. Notwithstanding, it
would certainly raise the stakes for such actors should they decide to
engage in such activity, which would further the goal of deterrence
while also ensuring that the victims of such attacks have a vehicle to
obtain compensation.

